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IV.  DOES CHINA HAVE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
IN THE LOW-END GARMENT INDUSTRY?
A CASE STUDY APPROACH
By Bala Ramasamy and Matthew Yeung*
Introduction
A new era began in the textile and garment industry on 1 January 2005. A four-
decade long system of trade restraints on the exports of textiles and garments ended
with the full implementation of ATC. An import quota system practiced by the developed
countries (particularly the United States and the European Union), while aimed at
protecting domestic producers in those countries, provided a ready market for textile
and garment producers in developing countries despite their inefficiencies in production.
The removal of the quotas and the re-emergence of China and India as economic
powerhouses have posed serious problems for several Asian developing economies
(e.g., Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic). Trade
economists feared that these countries would be unable to compete with China despite
a temporary safeguard measure imposed by the European Union and the United States
that is valid until the end of 2008 (Nordås, 2004).
China’s pre-eminent position as the world’s largest exporter of textiles and
garments is beyond doubt. The ADB reported that in 2005 China controlled more than a
quarter of the market share of clothing imports in the United States and a third of the
European Union’s imports of textile and clothing. What drives China’s advantage in this
industry? Macro studies tend to point to, among other factors, China’s low labour costs.
However, economic development in China is also pushing wage rates upwards. To what
extent is the low labour cost argument true? What are other drivers that cement China’s
position as the “tailor to the world”? To what extent are restrictive trade policies affecting
individual firms? Can Chinese garment manufacturers continue to dominate the garment
industry in the long term? This chapter attempts to answer these questions by using a
case study approach. Other studies have considered similar questions at a macro level
(Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley 2007; Tong, 2006; Yamagata, 2007; Yang, 1995, 1999;
Yang and Zhong, 1998). However, in-depth case studies of garment manufacturers are
capable of providing insights that could help producers and policy makers in their
decision- making. In this chapter, a comparison is made of two garment manufacturers
– one located in Beijing and the other in Jakarta – their cost structures and the
challenges they face in their respective countries.
Section A provides a general discussion of the trade policies within the garment
industry and its implications for China. Section B provides an overview of the garment
industry in China. Section C introduces the methodology used in this study, particularly
a description of the manufacturers who form the basis of the study. Section D provides
the findings, followed by a discussion of the results in section E.
* The authors acknowledge a grant provided by ESCAP for undertaking this study. Thanks are
also due to Yuan Yizhou for his research assistance.112
A. Quotas, no quotas, more quotas
Historically, the textile and garment industry has been the most regulated
manufacturing sector in international trade. In an effort to protect their domestic
industries, the European Union and the United States restricted imports of textiles from
Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. These restrictions were then extended to countries such
as India, Hong Kong, China, and Pakistan. These restraints, which were complex in
nature, were brought together under the MFA in 1974. Developed countries were
allowed to impose export restraints on developing countries under the MFA if there was
evidence of market disruptions in their home markets. The MFA quota regime and
increasing labour costs resulted in the outsourcing of labour-intensive production of
garments to low-cost countries following the “flying geese pattern”, i.e., from Japan to
the newly industrialized countries to South-East Asia. As China and Viet Nam ventured
into reforms of their respective economies, they also have been recipients of these
investments. Unexpectedly, the MFA resulted in the emergence of garment industries in
countries that did not have a true competitive advantage in the sector (Deutsche Bank,
2005). However, this provided a launching pad for industrialization among LDCs (Nordås,
2004; Brenton and Hoppe, 2007).
On 1 January 1995, the plan to phase out the MFA during the following 10 years
led to ATC, under which quotas were to be gradually removed in four stages resulting in
a complete no-quota environment on 1 January 2005. The growing economic prowess of
China and its accession to WTO in 2001 were perhaps in the minds of negotiators
since ATC allowed importers to impose safeguard measures if there was evidence to
show there as an imminent threat to their own domestic industry. Although China was
excluded from the agreement in the initial phases, the increase in quotas in the earlier
stages was grandfathered into the later stages when China acceded to WTO. However,
a no-quota environment for China only lasted a few months as the United States
initiated safeguard measures on 12 apparel and textile products (later increased to 34
product categories) until the end of 2008.
The European Union was more supportive of liberalization in that it imposed
safeguards on 10 product categories that were to last until 2008. The European Union
also agreed that it would not extend the safeguards after 2008. Nevertheless, under the
China accession protocol, member States can impose product-specific safeguard mea-
sures for 12 years after accession, and China’s status as a non-market economy allows
other member States to impose anti-dumping and countervailing actions against China
until 2016. Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Peru, South Africa and Turkey have thus far taken
action against China. Ironically, while the objective of extending the quota environment
was to protect domestic suppliers, research tends to suggest that imports from China
are being diverted to other low-cost and perhaps less efficient international producers
(Brambilla and others, 2007). Despite such evidence, the possibility of China experienc-
ing a quota-free environment in the near future looks bleak. Thus, it is necessary for
Chinese garment manufacturers to assume that a quota-imposed environment will
continue for the next 10 years and to make the necessary strategic decisions.
B. Textile and garment industry in the Chinese economy
The textile and garment industry has been a strategic component of China’s
economy since 1949. Like many other industries, it had experienced both stagnancy and
receding competitiveness by the end of the command economy era. Under the Reform
and Opening-up Policy, the industry has undertaken major changes since the late113
1970s. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) went through privatization, and private compa-
nies (including firms with foreign investment) have now become leading players in the
industry.
The growth of the textile and garment industry has gone hand-in-hand with
China’s economic takeoff since the 1980s. Annual output increase in the garment
industry during the past 20 years was about 15 per cent, relatively higher than the
country’s overall GDP growth of about 10 per cent a year. However, it has lost its
position as the leading industrial sector in the Chinese economy. In 1985, the top five
industries in China by proportion of total industrial output were textiles (12.1 per cent),
food, beverages and tobacco (12 per cent), machinery (10.9 per cent), metallurgy (8.6
per cent) and construction materials (6.9 per cent). By 1995, the top five industries by
proportion of total industrial output were food, beverages and tobacco (10.9 per cent),
metallurgy (9.5), machinery (8.2 per cent), textiles (8.2) and construction materials (7.7
per cent). In 2005, textile output was ranked seventh (4.6 per cent) while the garment
industry ranked seventeenth (1.9 per cent) among various industries (table 1).
In 1993, China became the world’s leading exporter of textiles and garments. In
2005, industrial output reached US$ 217.6 billion, with a total export value exceeding
US$ 100 billion. Although in terms of industrial output other more technology-based
industries such as communications equipment, computers and other electronic equip-
ment became more important, the growth in the manufacturing of textiles, wearing
apparel, footwear and caps increased dramatically (see table 1).
Although China’s textile and garment industry enjoyed continuous expansion and
its share of GDP growth remained stable, its contribution to China’s total exports
appears to have decreased. In 1996, the industry accounted for 2.7 per cent of GDP
and 6.5 per cent of total industrial output, and employed 12.4 per cent of the labour
force. Comparatively, in 2005, the industry accounted for about 2.9 per cent of China’s
GDP, 7 per cent of China’s total industrial output and 13.4 per cent of employment in
industries. However, the following figure shows that the proportion of textile and garment
exports decreased from 23.1 per cent in 1996 to 15.1 per cent in 2005. It should be
noted, however, that the export value has tripled.
In 2005, China’s total exports of textiles and garments amounted to US$ 115
billion. The export of garments was US$ 73.9 billion, among which Asia (42 per cent),
EU 25 (19 per cent) and North America (21 per cent) were major destinations. Japan,
the United States, Hong Kong, China, the European Union, the Russian Federation and
the Republic of Korea were the major national markets. Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans
etc. (HS Code 6110) comprised the largest exported category in 2006. As table 2
shows, China’s total exports of knitted and non-knitted garments increased by 489 per
cent and 200 per cent, respectively, but that exports of men’s trousers and shirts were
below industry average.
Prior to 2001, the textile and garment industry accounted for 5 per cent of FDI into
China, and foreign enterprises contributed about 35 per cent of total exports. The increase
of FDI in the industry has been higher than the national average since 2000. From 2000 to
2005, FDI into China grew by 48.2 per cent, while FDI into the textile and garment sector
increased by 56.2 per cent. The major investors were from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan
Province of China, Japan and the United States, and the investment primarily went to
coastal regions. In 2006, FDI in the garment sector was 30.9 per cent of the total amount
of investment while in the textile sector it amounted to 16.5 per cent. In December 2004,
China lifted restrictions vis-à-vis region, equity structure and total number for foreign


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Export value of China’s textile and garment industry, 1996-2005















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Export value (US$ 100 million) Per cent of total export value
Table 2.  China’s garment exports, 1996 and 2006: selected items
HS Garment type Export value, Export value, Per cent
Code 1996 (US$) 2006 (US$) increase
61 Articles of apparel, accessories,
knit or crochet 7 626 391 947 44 900 426 797 489
62 Articles of apparel, accessories,
not knit or crochet 14 570 613 800 43 720 321 656 200
6110 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans
etc., knit or crochet 2 529 116 127 12 858 753 806 408
610342 Men’s or boys’ trousers,
overalls, breeches, cotton, knitted 101 250 996 349 186 224 245
610510 Men’s or boys’ shirts, cotton,
knitted 33 510 330 144 144 213 330
620342 Men’s or boys’ trousers and
shorts, cotton, not knit 1 067 967 088 3 214 116 820 201
620530 Men’s or boys’ shirts, man-made
fibres 382 015 593 779 491 671 104
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database.116
Despite growth in output and profitability in the textile and garment industry, 20
per cent of the small and medium-sized garment enterprises reported losses. State-
owned enterprises now comprise less than 1 per cent of the total industry, while the
private sector dominates the industry. In general, SOEs lag behind private and foreign
enterprises in terms of profitability, although they appear to be larger in terms of
average number of employees. Compared to domestically owned private firms, foreign
enterprises are more capital intensive, suggesting higher technological standards. The
correlation between asset/size ratio and profitability appears to support the perception
that China’s labour cost advantage in the textile and garment industry may be ebbing
(table 3). For example, the average salary in Shenzhen rose nearly three-fold in the
past 10 years, and a yarn worker in Zhejiang may earn 70 per cent more than a similar
worker in Henan, an inland province that is rich in labour supply. Therefore, many
manufacturers are already relocating to third-tier towns and even other provinces to
retain cost advantage. Moving production locations to South-East Asia is also being
considered as an option.
Location being a decisive factor, China’s textile and garment industry is distinc-
tively regionalized. The five coastal provinces, that is, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu,
Shanghai and Shandong, comprise the majority of industrial output by producing 81 per
cent of chemical fibre, 60 per cent of yarn and 66 per cent of cloth. The five provinces
combined account for 77.2 per cent of China’s total export value of textiles and
garments (tables 4 and 5).
China has emphasized the upgrading of industrial productivity by investing in the
technology side. In 2005, the import value of equipment was US$ 3.45 billion, an 80 per
cent increase compared with 2000. The top five exporting provinces took up 83 per cent
of the imports of equipment, mostly from Japan, Germany and Italy.
In sum, the textile and garment industry is vital for the national economy,
employment, and foreign trade, not only for China but also for other labour-intensive
economies including Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Viet Nam. The biggest
future challenge for China’s textile and garment industry is its competitive advantage.
Cheap labour, which was once the source of this advantage, is gradually becoming
scarcer, particularly in the coastal areas that continue to dominate China’s textile and
garment industry. China is losing this advantage to other developing countries in the
region that are also rich in labour supply.
China has actively engaged in the global textile and garment market, although it
is estimated that China is mainly producing OEM and only accounts for 10 per cent of
the total value added of the end product.1  China’s textile and garment industry is
heavily dependent on exports, and the end of ATC did not give China an easy passage
to overwhelming market share. Rather, renewed trade disputes and barriers emerged.
Therefore, China is trying to increase its efficiency in the textile and garment industry in
the post-ATC era by upgrading technologies and improving supply chains etc. However,
these measures will further undermine the cost advantage in low-end garment manufac-
ture. Using a case study approach, the following sections show the loss of advantage
that China is experiencing in these low value-added products. China is pressed to find a
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Table 4.  Leading Provinces in the textile industry in China
Chemical Yarn Cloth
Province fibre Province (10 000 tons) Province (100 million
(10 000 tons) metres)
Zhejiang 660.33 Shandong 371.77 Zhejiang 96.20
Jiangsu 501.95 Jiangsu 335.60 Jiangsu 90.46
Shandong 95.38 Henan 141.80 Shandong 90.17
Fujian 70.12 Zhejiang 96.41 Guangdong 40.41
Shanghai 49.78 Hubei 89.82 Hebei 30.76
Guangdong 39.91 Hebei 68.59 Henan 23.65
Henan 39.73 Fujian 64.53 Hubei 23.40
Sichuan 26.56 Anhui 38.31 Fujian 21.69
Jilin 24.36 Guangdong 36.64 Chongqing 14.55
Liaoning 23.70 Xinjiang 27.90 Shaanxi 10.67
Hebei 22.67 Hunan 26.06 Sichuan 7.93
Tianjin 20.54 Sichuan 25.48 Anhui 6.66
Jiangxi 18.07 Jiangxi 20.44 Liaoning 5.71
Heilongjiang 17.83 Shaanxi 19.43 Jiangxi 4.12
Hubei 11.74 Liaoning 17.41 Hunan 3.70
Anhui 11.36 Guangxi 11.87 Shanxi 3.63
Hunan 8.29 Shanghai 11.65 Tianjin 2.85
Xinjiang 5.42 Shanxi 10.39 Shanghai 1.55
Hainan 4.61 Tianjin 7.32 Xinjiang 1.34
Yunnan 3.04 Chongqing 6.90 Heilongjiang 1.10
Source: China Textile Industry Development Report 2005-2006.
Table 5.  Chinese regional contributions to textile and garment
exports and imports, 2005
Exports Imports Exports Exports,
Province (US$ 10 000)  (US$ 10 000) and imports   per cent of
(US$ 10 000) China total
Zhejiang 2 443 507 114 855 2 558 361 21.2
Guangdong 2 201 023 763 042 2 964 065 19.1
Jiangsu 1 881 968 204 166 2 086 133 16.3
Shanghai 1 286 866 227 549 1 514 415 11.2
Shandong 1 061 994 150 782 1 212 776 9.2
Five provinces combined 8 875 358 1 460 394 10 335 750 77.2
China total 11 503 337 1 713 619 13 216 956 100
Source: Annual Report on China’s International Trade in Textiles and Clothing, 2005-2006.119
C. Methodology
In an effort to understand clearly the issues discussed above, we now focus on
a representative garment factory in China and analyse its cost structure for a few
selected products. As a comparison, a representative firm in Indonesia was selected
and an attempt was made to obtain similar information. Although only the cost of cut,
make and trim was considered, the problems faced by each producer at various levels
of production were explored. In order to ensure valid comparability, the collection of cost
data was limited to men’s shirts and men’s trousers. Since these product categories are
basic in terms of fashion and standard in terms of design, comparing manufacturers in
two different countries is possible. In this way, it is possible to highlight the competitive
advantage of China, if any, to its counterpart in Indonesia. The latter country was for the
comparison due to the importance of the industry to the Indonesian economy resulting
from of the changes in quota arrangements.
Information was collected from in-depth, face-to-face interviews at the city where
the manufacturers had their offices, i.e., Beijing and Jakarta. In the case of the Beijing
manufacturer, the interviewee was the general manager of the company, while the Jakarta
interviewee was the owner. In addition, three other garment manufacturers were
interviewed – two in China and one in Jakarta – who were not engaged in the production
of shirts and trousers, but had an in-depth knowledge of the industry. The interviews,
which lasted between 2 hours and 2.5 hours, were conducted in a cordial manner. The
interviewees were extremely helpful and more than willing to share their experience with
the interviewers. Additional information was solicited through e-mail at later stages.
The interviews focused on a number of issues including the cost of production,
availability of raw materials, labour quality and availability, quotas and tariffs, quality
standards and requirements, customs procedures, and governance and regional agree-
ments.
Brief profiles of the companies interviewed are provided below. The names of the
companies have been kept confidential for competitive reasons.
1.  Company A in Jakarta
Established in 1989, Company A is a garment manufacturer in Jakarta, Indone-
sia. Starting from basic garment products, it has grown into a competitive regional and
international market participant. It has developed two business units – Firm S for OEM
and Firm T for proprietary branding. Firm S now boasts 800 employees, 10 production
lines and an annual capacity of 2 million pieces. Firm T is of similar size, with a
capacity of about 700 employees and 10 lines.
The main products of the company include woven and knitted ladies’ apparel,
blouses, skirts, trousers etc., and production is backed by digital technology. Firm S
aims to be a solution provider by incorporating in-house facilities and by practicing rigid
AQL quality controls. Production is divided into three departments: cutting, sewing and
finishing. Both Firm S and Firm T have a daily output of about 5,000 pieces. Company
A has been a supplier of many renowned apparel brands to the European Union and
the United States, including Liz Claiborne, Quicksilver and Kellwood. About 60 per cent
of its exports go to the United States, 30 per cent to the European Union and 10 per
cent to the rest of the world. Firm S may have benefited from its locational advantage
in east Jakarta’s Export Processing Zone (e.g., efficiency in export procedures and
enhanced security).120
Company A aims to be a leader in the regional garment market by emphasizing
both quality and corporate responsibility. Since 1998, Firm S has been a certified vendor
of Target and Wal-Mart. In 2005, it obtained ISO 9002 Quality Certification. Firm S and
Firm T also received their Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) certifica-
tion in 2003 and 2007, respectively.
2. Company C in Beijing
Company C is a SOE located in Beijing, and a leading SOE in the industry. It
has a number of subsidiaries producing various types of textiles and garments. It also
has a dedicated subsidiary that focuses on its international trading activities. With offices
in Japan, the United States and the United Arab Emirates, Company C is among the
top 100 garment exporters in China with a total export value of US$ 75 million in 2005.
The focus here is on two subsidiaries that are engaged in the production of
men’s shirts and men’s trousers. Firm X and Firm Y were established in 1996 in an
economic development zone, 40 km from Beijing and 60 km from Tianjin, one of the
busiest ports in northern China. Firm X is a Sino-Japanese joint venture that currently
has about 1,000 employees, 22 production lines and 4 workshops (1 cutting, 2 tailoring,
and 1 dyeing and finishing). The fixed assets exceed yuan renminbi 22 million (US$ 3
million), and the majority of the machines have been imported from Japanese textile
equipment manufacturers Brother and Juki. The products of Firm Y include jackets,
trousers, suits and skirts, with a total annual output of about 1.6 million pieces. Firm X
enjoys customer design capacities and its products fulfill the nation’s first-class quality
ranking for garment exports. Firm X’s international partners include GAP, Columbia and
Liz Claiborne.
Firm Y is a Sino-United States joint venture that currently has about 660 staff
members and 5 workshops (1 cutting and 4 tailoring), 17 production lines (9 for shirts,
4 for fashion and 4 for other garment lines). Most of the production equipment was
imported from Japan and its products include shirts, blouses, and fashion and other
garments. The company’s annual output is about 1.6 million pieces, which are mainly
exported to Japan, the United States, Germany and Australia. Firm Y received ISO9002
certification in 2000.
3. Additional interviews
Mr. J, who is from Hong Kong, China, has factories in Guangdong province,
China. He was involved in the production of men’s shirt and trousers seven years ago
but decided to move on to higher value-added products. Currently, Mr. J focuses on the
design and production of wedding gowns for export.
Mr. U is a German who owns a manufacturing plant in Zhejiang province, China.
He also has a showroom in Shanghai with headquarters located in Macau, China. Mr. U
has been involved in the garment industry for more than 30 years, building up his
current business from scratch. He also engages in consulting for foreign enterprises
dealing with textiles and garments in China.
Mr. C is a Malaysian who has lived in Indonesia for the past 30 years. He
specializes in the garment trade although he does not own any plants. He acts as an
intermediary between clients in the United States and the European Union, and producers
in Indonesia. As such, Mr. C is well versed in the issues considered in this project.121
D.  Findings
1.  Cost of production
Surprisingly, there appears to be no difference in direct labour costs between the
manufacturer in Beijing and the one in Jakarta. Both reported that the direct labour cost
was US$ 0.90 per shirt and US$ 1.10 per pair of trousers. There is also no significant
difference between the average monthly salaries of production workers and supervisors
in the two locations. On average, production workers earn between US$ 120-US$ 130
per month, while supervisors earn about US$ 200 per month. However, there appears to
be a difference in productivity in shirt making. In Beijing, the productivity is 14.54 shirts
per worker, while in Jakarta it is 11.90. This may be due to higher capital intensity as
the Beijing manufacturer reported 45 machines per production line compared to 34 in
Jakarta. There does not appear to be a significant difference in productivity in trouser
making, i.e., 8.57 pairs of trousers per worker in Beijing compared with 8.70 in Jakarta,
although the number of machines per line in Jakarta is greater.
It is also interesting to note that the cost of raw materials in the form of fabric
and accessories shows an insignificant difference between the two locations. For a
standard specification of 133 x 72/40 x 40 at 48”/50” width (used for shirt production),
the cost in both countries was reported to be US$ 1.32 – US$ 1.35 per yard. For
trouser production, fabric of 120 x 80/32 x 32, width 48”/50” costs between US$ 1.53
and US$ 1.55 per yard. Accessory (buttons, zippers etc.) costs range from 50 cents
for shirts to 80 cents for trousers in both countries. The Chinese manufacturer
sources most of the required fabric from within China but about 10 per cent is
sourced from overseas. In particular, more fancy fabric (for other items such as
blouses etc.) is imported from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China.
The Indonesian manufacturer sources 90 per cent of his fabric for shirt production
from foreign suppliers, i.e., China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of
China (the ratio being 30 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively). For
trousers, 50 per cent of the fabrics are imported from China, while the remainder is
from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. There do not appear to be
any issues in sourcing as the delivery lead-time in both countries ranges from 20-30
days for plain dyed fabric to 35-40 days for yarn-dyed fabric. The interesting point to
note here is that despite sourcing the fabric from China, the Indonesian manufacturer
is still able to obtain it at a price and a lead-time that is competitive to the Chinese
producer.
Utility costs are more expensive in China than in Indonesia. For example, the
cost of electricity in Beijing is US$ 0.104 per kWh compared with US$ 0.06 in
Jakarta. The cost of rental is also far higher in Beijing. The cost of office space in
Beijing is US$ 172.41 per m2 per year compared with only US$ 18 in Jakarta. It was
not possible to determine the cost of factory space as it is fully owned by the Beijing
operator. The cost of capital is not relevant in these two cases because the Beijing
operator has a small loan while in Indonesia garment manufacturers are not eligible
for bank loans.2
2 As a result of the 1997 economic crisis in Asia, the Indonesian Central Bank blacklisted
companies in the textile and garment industry as they had a high degree of non-performing loans.
Ten years after the crisis, the industry continues to be penalized by the financial community.122
Quotas can be a major cost to Chinese producers. In the case of the Beijing
manufacturer, the government allocated quotas for shirts and trousers are quite small.
For these government allocated quotas, the manufacturer needs to pay US$ 0.80 per
dozen shirts and US$ 1.75 per dozen pairs of trousers. If quotas are purchased from
the open market, the cost can go up to US$ 4-US$ 5 per dozen shirts and US$ 10-
US$ 15 per dozen pairs of trousers. Hence, while the quotas can provide some
protection for a manufacturer, they can also hamper production. The manufacturer
insisted that the removal of the quota for the products in question in 2007 by the
European Union and in 2008 by the United States could reduce the cost and provide
more opportunities for China’s garment manufacturers. Quota costs do not apply to the
Indonesian manufacturer.
Neither manufacturer is required to pay import duties as these are paid by the
buyers.3  In the case of Indonesia, VAT of 10 per cent is imposed on fabrics bought
from local sources. However, if the fabric is used for export purposes, a 60 per cent
rebate is offered, although this may involve a six-month waiting period. In the case of
imported fabrics, a 2.5 per cent duty is imposed. In China, VAT is imposed on all
materials purchased locally. However, if the materials are used for export purposes, an
11 per cent refund is granted for garments.4  It should be noted that this rebate has
gradually been reduced by the Chinese authorities.
2.  Issues in production
The lead-time for production is quite similar for both locations. Both manufactur-
ers reported similar periods, i.e., 30 days. However, the rejection rate experienced by
the Chinese producer was far higher than the Indonesian manufacturer (i.e., 5 per cent
to 10 per cent in China compared with 2 per cent in Indonesia).
Perhaps the most important issue raised by both respondents was labour-related
matters. The Chinese producer complained that there was an acute shortage of skilled
labour, which increased his production costs. Increasingly, customers are moving their
orders towards South-East Asian countries such as Viet Nam and Cambodia. On the
other hand, the Indonesian producer lamented that the labour laws provided an
advantage to workers. In 2007, for example, the minimum wage rate was increased from
Rp 819 100 (about US$ 89) to Rp 900 516 (about US$ 99).5  Compliance with the
minimum wage law is mandatory not only because it is required by law, but also due to
pressure by the customer for the producer to comply with WRAP. Under WRAP, wages,
working hours, minimum working age, benefits, safety and health etc. are stated in
detail. The Indonesian producer has the required WRAP certification, but the result is
higher production costs. The tight labour law with regard to remuneration also does not
allow the producer to switch to a piece rate system.
The labour issues in China must not be underestimated. It was reported by one
of the additional interviewees that there was a tendency for management as well the
workers to opt out of a legal contract so that welfare payments (which may be up to 25
3 The agreement with the buyer from the European Union and/or United States is on an FOB
basis.
4 For textile production, the rebate is lower at 9 per cent.
5 As a comparison, in 2007 the minimum wage rate in Beijing is Y 730 (about US$ 96)
compared with Y 640 (about US$ 84) in 2006.123
per cent of total salaries) need not be paid to the Government.6  A lower than actual
number of workers are reported to the authorities, which results in a smaller amount of
welfare contribution being paid by the producer while the workers get to keep a larger
portion of their income. In such cases, the incentive to pay on a piece rate and/or lower
than minimum wages is likely. In a competitive market like that for shirts/trousers, bad
producers can drive out the good ones.
Interestingly, neither of the producers complained about custom procedures or
illegally solicited payments, either in their operations or in the transportation of their
output. This may be due to their factories being located in free trade or bonded zones.
However, the Indonesian producer allocates 0.2 per cent of total sales for this purpose.
The Chinese producer, being an SOE, need not deal with these issues. Similarly,
sourcing for fabric and accessories was not considered an issue, at least in the
production of shirts and trousers. However, this may emerge as a problem for more
fancy garments, which require fabric that is more sophisticated.
Finally, both producers are focusing their efforts towards markets in the Euro-
pean Union, the United States and, to a certain extent, Japan. Regional agreements do
not appear to have benefited either producer. The Indonesian manufacturer, despite
having some business in the ASEAN region, was unaware of any regional efforts that
contributed to his industry. The Beijing manufacturer had no comment on regional
agreements affecting garments.
E.  Discussion and conclusion
Despite current belief that China has abundant cheap labour to offer in the low-
end garment industry, the authors’ research found no such evidence. There is no clear
competitive advantage for China compared to its rivals in South-East Asia. In China,
several factors may have contributed to the rising cost of labour. China continues to be
the economic powerhouse in Asia, attracting investors from many types of industries.
Local companies are also expanding in order to satisfy the insatiable appetite of
Chinese consumers. Thus, the demand for labour is continuously increasing, particularly
skilled labour or at least labour that is trainable. The low-end garment industry needs to
compete with other industries in attracting talent, pushing up wage rates. In addition, the
rising cost of living, as highlighted by the increasing inflation rate over the past few
months, is forcing workers to demand higher wages. In other words, the cheap labour
advantage in China is becoming a myth rather than a reality.
In order to remain competitive, Chinese manufacturers have two choices. First,
they can move west towards the inland provinces, where cheap but unskilled labour may
be still available. If it is critical that they remain in the coastal provinces for logistical
reasons, shifting production operations to third- or fourth-tier cities within these prov-
inces may be an option. However, accessibility to skilled labour in those smaller cities
may still be an issue as the migration of workers to larger cities continues. However,
such a move would provide some solace, at least in the short term. In fact, relocating to
smaller cities is already a trend among some garment producers (CTEI, 2007). Second,
Chinese producers may need to consider relocating to neighbouring South-East Asian
6 This may not be the case with the interviewed Chinese manufacturer as it is a state-owned
enterprise.124
countries such as Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam in
order to take advantage of relatively cheaper labour in those countries. There may be
logistics issues in some of those countries, but the cost of losing foreign customers to
other more competitive producers will be greater. More importantly, the findings of the
present study show the need for Chinese producers to move towards higher-end
garments. As emphasized by the consultants during this study, profit margins are higher
for high-end garments such as sportswear and fashionable women’s wear. However, this
changeover would need a greater investment in improving the skills of the current labour
force, establishing sources for more sophisticated fabric and securing orders for such
items from clients.
Based on the price of fabrics paid by the two interviewed manufacturers, it is
clear that China also does not have a true competitive advantage, either in cost or in
availability of the raw materials. The Indonesian producer, although importing a large
portion of his fabric, is able to secure a price similar to the Chinese producer. A
reduction in the cost of imports due to lower transportation costs on the one hand, and
tariff liberalization policies on the other, point to an advantage that China will continue to
lose in the medium term. In fact, as Chinese producers move to higher-end garment
items, more resources will be allocated to fabrics that are more sophisticated rather
than those required for lower-end products. In the long term, China may have to turn to
imports for low-end fabrics.
China’s lack of a competitive advantage brings us to the issue of quotas. If the
direct cost of production between the Chinese and the Indonesian producer is more or
less the same, the price paid for the quota puts the Chinese producer at a clear
disadvantage. The cost of quotas may be forcing Chinese producers to engage in illegal
practices, e.g., transshipping through South-East Asian countries, or the exploitation of
workers by providing a less than appropriate work environment. Since quotas are an
added cost to Chinese producers, it is not surprising that the interviewed Chinese
manufacturer reported a maximum profit margin of 8 per cent compared with the 10 per
cent earned by his Indonesian counterpart. Considering the appreciation of the yuan
renminbi since the middle of 2006 (it has reportedly appreciated about 10 per cent
since China adjusted its exchange rate policies in July 20057), it is obvious that Chinese
producers at the low end of the garment industry are being squeezed out of their
profits. Therefore, the exports of these low-end products by China should decline. As
table 6 shows, after a sudden spurt of growth in 2005 due to a no-quota environment,
the growth in exports of knitted and woven garments to the United States in 2005/06
was relatively lower. The growth in the export of shirts (knitted or crocheted) in 2005/06
was far higher than the sector average, i.e., 83.3 per cent compared with the average of
23.1 per cent. However, non-knitted shirts (HS6205) literally stagnated (-1.3 per cent) in
2006.
Why is there a difference between exports of knitted and non-knitted shirts to
the United States? It is likely that more orders for non-knitted shirts are being directed
to South-East Asia compared with orders for knitted shirts. The fabric for non-knitted
shirts is less cumbersome, and the most important capital investment needed is sewing
machines. On the other hand, for knitted shirts, producers require machines that can
weave the yarn before cut, make and trim can take place. In other words, knitted shirt
production is relatively more capital- and skill-intensive. It is therefore quite likely that, in
the medium term, more non-knitted shirt production will be moved out of China.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on the above findings and the export figures for 2005 and 2006, one
of two scenarios is likely to occur in 2009. Here, emphasis is on the situation with
regard to the United States, as it is the only nation to impose a substantial quota on
China.
In scenario one, the status quo is maintained, i.e., no major increases in exports
of low-end garments to the United States. The reason is the realization by American
buyers that China has lost its competitive advantage to other producers in the region.
Orders that were meant for China gradually move towards other countries such as
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam. Thus, in
scenario one, the removal of quotas would have minimal effect on imports of low-end
garments by the United States.
Scenario two assumes that United States buyers are unaware of China’s
declining competitive advantage in these low-end products. If such is the case, the
removal of quotas would result in an increase in orders from the United States buyers,
perhaps diverting the orders from other developing countries such as Mexico or Turkey.
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Chinese producers may not be willing to reject
these orders despite a higher cost of production. The Chinese may be forced to move
their operations inland or to outsource the labour-intensive production to lower cost
locations in South-East Asia. In such a scenario, whether exports increase would
depend on the location to which production would be shifted.
Scenario two is probably the more likely outcome. If that is indeed the case, the
Government of China will need to address the issue, as it may invite further retaliation
from the Government of the United States on the one hand, and a misallocation of
Chinese resources on the other. As mentioned above, the future of China’s garment
industry is in the higher value-added categories. It is therefore advisable for the
Government of China to steer the industry in that direction. The possible policy
considerations include: (a) removing the tax rebate that is currently granted for low-end
products; (b) providing incentives to move production to inland provinces and/or other
low-cost locations such as South-East Asia; and (c) offering incentives to produce high
value-added garments, including the creation of Chinese brands.
This chapter shows that China’s labour cost advantage in low-end garment
products, particularly men’s shirts and trousers, is being lost to other producers in the
region. The advantage of producing its own fabrics is also not strong enough to
compete with producers of neighbouring countries. Increasing labour costs, coupled with
an added quota cost and an appreciating currency, is forcing China’s producers to move
production to smaller cities or to outsource them completely to cheaper manufacturers in
other countries. The future of China’s garment industry lies in higher-end products that
involve fabrics, designs and technology that are more sophisticated. The good news is
that the industry is developed enough to meet these challenges. The modernization of
its factories over the past two decades, and the clustering of firms in the textile and
garment industry through government-directed efforts, can sustain China’s position as
the “tailor to the world”.
For garment producers in competing countries, particularly developing and
emerging economies in South-East Asia, greater linkages with Chinese garment produc-
ers are critical. These linkages, for example by being part of China’s supply chain, could
open markets in the developed countries and, more importantly, the growing Chinese
market.127
A clear limitation in this research is the case study method used. A larger
number of manufacturers would increase the credibility of the above findings. However,
given limited resources, it is hoped that these findings will assist the protagonists in the
garment industry.128
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